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Abstract 
The paper provides a measure of exchange rate anchoring behaviour across 149 emerging
market and developing economies for the 1980-2010 period. An extension of the Frankel and 
Wei (2008) methodology is used to determine whether exchange rates are pegged or floating,
and in the case of pegs, to which anchor currencies they are pegged. To capture the role of
major currencies over time, an aggregate trade-weighted indicator is constructed based on 
exchange rate regimes of individual countries. The evolution of this aggregate indicator
suggests that the US dollar has continuously dominated exchange rate regimes, despite some 
temporary decoupling during major financial crises. 
JEL Classification Numbers:  F30, F31, F33 
Keywords:  de facto exchange rate regimes, international monetary system, emerging and
developing economies, global currencies. 5
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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
Over the past three decades many small open economies have used the US dollar as nominal 
anchor in their exchange rate regime with the aim of reducing and stabilising inflation and/or 
fostering international regional integration. In the wake of the currency crises that affected 
emerging and developing countries in the 1990s, many systemically important economies in 
Latin America and Asia have started to increase the flexibility of their exchange rate in order 
to stabilise output and deal with volatile capital flows.  
This paper contributes to the empirical literature on the de facto exchange rate regimes in 
emerging and developing economies. We propose a synthetic measure of exchange rate 
practices over the period 1980 to 2010, using a sample of 149 emerging and developing 
countries. We use an enhanced version of the methodology proposed by Frankel and Wei 
(2008). Under this methodology, the degree of exchange rate flexibility and the anchor 
choice are simultaneously estimated. We improve upon the original methodology by 
proposing a dynamic measure of exchange rate practices obtained through recursive 
constrained linear least-squares of the currency exchange rate variation against the variation 
of SDR currencies and a flexibility indicator. This enables us to generate anchor currency 
weights for all countries in the sample on a monthly basis from 1980 to 2010. 
The individual country results are then aggregated on a trade-weighted basis into a global 
indicator of exchange rate regime choice. This indicator captures both the degree of exchange 
rate flexibility and the global weights of the main anchor currencies. Our global indicator 
suggests that there have been over the past 30 years no systematic or trend shifts in exchange 
rate practices of emerging market and developing countries. The US dollar has remained the 
main anchor currency, with the euro as a distant second, throughout the entire sample period. 
Nevertheless, there has been some short-term variation in exchange rate practices, in 
particular during major financial crises when several emerging markets were forced to 
(temporarily) abandon or adjust their pegs. Also, we find some more heterogeneous 
evolutions at a regional level, in particular for central and eastern European and CIS 
countries, where the US dollar’s weight has decreased over the past two decades at the 
benefit of a shift toward euro anchoring and enhanced exchange rate flexibility. 
To examine the main drivers of these observed tendencies, we provide an empirical 
examination of the determinants of anchor currency choice. Given the specific nature of our 
indicator of exchange rate regimes, we perform tobit panel estimations that include as 
explanatory variables trade network effects, the currency denomination of long-term debt as 
well as regional aspects. The panel estimation results suggest that the evolution of exchange 
rate configurations can be mainly explained by structural shifts in global trade and long-term 
external debt denomination. Also regional network effects play a significant role in 
explaining anchor currency choices, suggesting that, at a regional level, a shift of one or 
several major countries towards another currency anchor, or towards more flexibility, may 
encourage their neighbours to follow such a shift. 6
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I.   INTRODUCTION
The demise of the Bretton Woods system in the early-1970s marked the end of the US 
dollar’s official role as a pivotal currency in global exchange rate arrangements, but many 
small open economies have since chosen to maintain some form of exchange rate link to a 
reserve currency such as the US dollar. This role of the US dollar as an exchange rate anchor 
is confirmed by both de jure and de facto exchange rate regime classifications.
1 The role of 
other anchor currencies, such as the British pound, virtually disappeared towards the end of 
the 1970s, while the role of the euro has become relatively more significant, albeit being 
largely limited to countries with close institutional and geographical ties with the euro area.
 2
Developments in the international financial system over the past decade have reshaped the 
evolution of the US dollar’s role in exchange rate regimes. Many large and systemically 
important emerging market economies in Latin America and Asia have adopted more flexible 
exchange rate regimes, in part due to their policy response to the financial crises of the 
second half of the 1990s. These policies were largely underpinned by the need to gain 
monetary policy autonomy, especially for countries adopting inflation targeting regimes. In 
the past few years, emerging market economies have taken steps to reduce the anchoring role 
of the US dollar. The global financial crisis of 2007-2010 may have triggered a further shift, 
as some countries (e.g. Russia) increased the flexibility of their exchange rates and lowered 
the weight of the US dollar in the currency basket used for setting exchange rate policy.  
The assessment of de facto exchange rate regimes is an important issue that has national and 
global implications. At the national level, the evolution of the so-called natural regime can 
be a useful tool to measure the disparity between the de jure and de facto exchange rate 
regime over time.
3 At the global level, such an assessment may have consequences for the 
pattern and adjustment of external imbalances. An aggregate measure of anchor currency 
choices may help gauge the impact that changes in the exchange rates between the main 
currencies could have for the unwinding of imbalances across countries and regions.  
Hence, there is a need for a better understanding of exchange rate practices in emerging 
markets and developing economies. This paper provides a systematic way of looking at the 
role played by anchor currencies or baskets of currencies, based on a sample of 149 emerging 
1 Tavlas et al (2008) provide a survey of the literature on de facto and de jure exchange rate regime 
classifications. 
2 Meissner and Oomes (2008) show that the share of countries anchoring their currency to the British pound 
declined from around 20 percent in the 1950s and 1960s to zero percent by the early-1980s. ECB (2009) lists 
around 50 countries and territories that assign some role to the euro in the formulation of their exchange rate 
policies. Most of these countries and territories are located on the European continent or have close institutional 
ties with the euro area countries. 
3 The natural classification was introduced by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). The gap between the de jure and de 
facto exchange rate regime can indicate “fear of floating” or alternatively, more discretion in the conduct of 
monetary policy.  7
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market and developing countries. An extension of Frankel and Wei (2008) is used to assess a 
country’s de facto exchange rate regime (i.e., hard peg, intermediate or freely floating) by 
simultaneously estimating the degree of exchange rate flexibility and the choice of the 
anchor. The paper is thus related with two strands of literature. On the one hand, in order to 
estimate the degree of exchange rate flexibility, we use techniques borrowed from the fixed-
versus-floating literature on the de facto exchange rate regime that a country follows in 
practice. On the other hand, for pegged regimes, we identify the currency or basket of 
currencies to which a particular country’s exchange rate is linked, and for currency baskets, 
we calculate the importance (weights) of individual currencies, similar to the literature on the 
choice of currency basket weights.  
Besides combining these two approaches on a larger set of countries, the paper proposes a 
measure of country exchange rate practices that varies over time. Individual country results 
are further aggregated on a trade-weighted basis into a composite measure of exchange rate 
regime choice. Such a global indicator is used to assess the importance of the US dollar, euro 
or other major currencies as exchange rate anchor anchors. Finally, we explore the 
determinants of anchor choices for emerging and developing countries. 
The main findings of our paper are twofold. First, there is no evidence of a systematic shift 
away from the US dollar as an anchor currency at the global level, based on the trade-
weighted indicator of exchange rate regimes. However, panel estimation results show 
heterogeneous trends at the regional level. In particular, for Central and Eastern European 
and CIS countries, the US dollar anchor weight has declined in tandem with a move towards 
a closer tracking of the euro and enhanced exchange rate flexibility. Second, the results 
suggest that the evolution of the anchoring role of currencies can be mainly explained by 
structural shifts in global trade and the currency denomination of long-term external debt. 
Moreover, regional network effects play a significant role in explaining anchor currency 
choices, suggesting that, if one or several major countries move towards an alternative 
currency anchor, or towards more flexibility, this encourages their neighbours in the region 
to follow.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the methodology and 
data used in the paper. Section 3 presents the main results of the estimation techniques for a 
number of individual countries and compares them to those with well-established exchange 
rate classifications, by way of robustness checks. Section  4 discusses the proposed new 
composite indicator of exchange rate regime choice, while Section 5 examines its main 
determinants. Section 6 concludes and draws some policy implications. 
II.   METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES AND DATASET
This study proposes a time-varying measure of exchange rate regimes choices for emerging 
market and developing economies to assess whether there is a systematic shift away from the 8
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US dollar standard in recent years. The measure is based on countries’ actual (de facto) 
exchange practices, rather than stated (de jure) behaviour. 
The two main aspects of regime choice, i.e. the degree of exchange rate flexibility and, in 
case of a peg or a managed float, the choice of the anchor currency/currencies, are jointly 
estimated. More precisely, monthly data on individual countries’ exchange rate fluctuations 
are explained by changes in anchor currencies and an exchange market pressure index 
reflecting the degree of currency flexibility. Our measure of exchange rate regime choice 
thus combines some methodological aspects from the literature on de facto exchange rate 
regimes with findings from the literature on basket currency weights.  
The literature on de facto regimes was developed by Ghosh et al. (2002), Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger (2003, 2005), Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), Calvo and Reinhart (2002), and 
Shambaugh (2004) to provide more accurate exchange rate classifications on the basis of 
observed exchange rate developments, rather than the declared behaviour by the authorities. 
The methodologies developed to this end aim to address a number of shortcomings of 
exchange rate regimes classifications, including the official (de jure) classification compiled 
by the IMF until the early-2000s.  
The literature on basket currency weights was developed during the first half of the 1990s by 
Frankel (1993) and Frankel and Wei (1994, 1995) to empirically infer the composition of 
exchange rate baskets. These techniques regained attention recently, as Eichengreen (2006), 
Yamazaki (2006), Frankel and Wei (2006) and Shah and Patnaik (2007) applied them to infer 
the basket weights in the exchange rate of the Chinese renminbi or the Indian rupee.  
The estimation procedure used in the paper is derived from Frankel and Wei (2008), the first 
authors to propose a systematic synthesis of the literature on de facto exchange rate regimes 
and basket currency weights. Frankel and Wei (2008) quantify the degree of exchange rate 
flexibility and the anchor currency choice in one single step by estimating the following 
relationship between exchange rate fluctuations of the home currency, exchange rate 
fluctuations of the basket currencies, and a market pressure index. 




s ikt ik it s it iFLEX 0 i it s it ) c ln c (ln ) emp emp ( e ln e ln ε β β β + − + − + = − ¦
=
+ + +       (1a) 






ik β       (1c) 
In the above set of equations, the change in the exchange rate of the home currency ( t e ) over 
a selected time span (s periods, typically a few months) is regressed on the percentage change 
in an exchange market pressure index ( t emp ) and the exchange rates of the four main 
currencies (euro, US dollar, Japanese yen and British pound, denoted 4 , 1 , = k ck ). The 9
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exchange rates are expressed in terms of a numeraire currency (the SDR). The coefficients 
FLEX β  and  4 , 1 , = k k β  indicate, respectively, the degree of independence of the exchange rate 
and the degree of anchoring vis-à-vis the four main anchor currencies. The exchange market 
pressures index (equation 1b)  is computed as the unweighted average of changes in the 
exchange rate and changes in foreign exchange reserves ( t RES ). As in Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2004), the bivariate index of exchange market pressure captures the degree of free floating 
as well as the episodes of free falling in the aftermath of a speculative attack. Finally, the 
regression equation is subject to the constraint that the weights on anchor currencies should 
add up to unity (equation 1c). This constraint is imposed on the model by subtracting the 
exchange rate of the British pound from both sides in equation (1a), which yields: 
t t t 3 t t 2
t t 1 t s t FLEX 0 t t
) GBP ln d JPY ln d ( ) GBP ln d USD ln d (
) GBP ln d EUR ln d ( ) emp emp ( GBP ln d e ln d
ε β β
β β β
+ − + − +
+ − + − + = − +
      (1d) 
Following the estimation of relation (1d) over a 4-year window of monthly data, Frankel and 
Wei (2008) provide estimates of anchor currency weights for 20 currencies characterised by 
different exchange rate arrangements over the last three decades. 
We extend and adjust Frankel and Wei’s (2008) methodology in several ways and estimate 
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where it e denotes the nominal exchange rate of currency i against  the reference currency (the 
SDR), t EUR , t USD , t JPY , and  t GBP  are the exchange rates of the anchor currencies, 
5 2,...,β β are the potential weights of the four anchor currencies (euro, US dollar, Japanese 
yen and British pound) in the currency basket, and  it ε is the error term.  it FLEX  is a bivariate 
flexibility index computed at the country level based on several variables that capture the 
policy choices and the behaviour of monetary authorities (see definition below).
4 The  1 i β
coefficient can thus be interpreted as the degree of currency flexibility. Finally, for all beta 
coefficients, the index t denotes the end date of the rolling 24-month window. 
                                                
4 In a recent survey paper, Tavlas et al. (2008) suggest to include monetary policy variables, such as interest 
rates. We only focus on the reserves variation instrument for data availability purposes but also because many 
developing countries have maintained controls on interest rates over the period under consideration.  10
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Our methodology differs from Frankel and Wei’s (2008) in several respects: 
First, the system is dynamically estimated by introducing a 24- month rolling estimation 
window. This allows us to produce time-varying weights (the betas) and is, in our view, 
preferable to a splitting of the sample period in specific sub-periods.  
Second, the exchange rate flexibility index ( it FLEX ) is defined as the weighted (rather than 
the unweighted) average of the variation in exchange rates and the variation in reserves. The 
weights of the two components are determined by their relative volatility (where 
2
e σ  and 
2
RES σ  denote the variance of the monthly variation in the nominal exchange rate and in total 
reserves over the period 1978-2010). This methodology is similar to Goldstein, Kaminsky 
and Reinhart (2000) and Calvo and Reinhart (2002) and allows us to adjust the index for 
differences in the amplitude of both components. The choice of these two components 
reflects the idea that monetary authorities can respond to pressures on the currency, by 
selling reserves in the foreign exchange market and/or by letting the currency depreciate, 
especially when defending a certain level of the exchange rate entails significant reserve 
losses. An estimated coefficient of zero for the flexibility indicator signifies a totally fixed 
exchange rate, whereas a coefficient of 1 signifies a freely floating currency and the absence 
of any intervention in the foreign exchange market. A strictly positive coefficient reflects 
either some degree of currency flexibility in the absence of real shocks on the currency, or an 
episode of speculative attack involving both changes in reserves and in the level of the 
exchange rate.
5
Third, the constraint that coefficients sum up to 1 includes not only the coefficients on the 
individual anchor currencies, but also the coefficient on the flexibility indicator (equation 
2c). Additionally, all coefficients are non-negative. A coefficient of 0 for one of the four 
main currencies ( 0 ,..., 4 i 1 i = β β ) indicates that the evolution of the exchange rate cannot be 
associated to changes in one major anchor currency, while a coefficient of 1 suggests that the 
currency is fully pegged to one of the four main currencies under consideration. 
Finally, the imposition of these constraints implies that the estimation technique is based on a 
constrained linear least squares optimisation procedure. The beta coefficients for the 
                                                
5 Apart from the clear cases of conventional and hard pegs, in practice, countries that declare to follow a 
floating regime actually intervene in the exchange market in order to limit the variability of their currency (fear 
of floating). There may also be the opposite case that countries declaring to follow a fixed exchange rate regime 
may adjust periodically the value of their currency or revise the reference for exchange rate (one example of 
exchange rates within crawling bands is Belarus, where the band widths are frequently adjusted). All these 
intermediate regimes require the presence of a flexibility index that includes not only the variability of the 
exchange rate itself but also a measure of the amount to which the authorities make use of the reserves 
instrument in order to smooth the fluctuations in the exchange rate. By construction, the flexibility index thus 
combines currency floating in absence of real shocks and cases of de-pegging in the aftermath of speculative 
attacks on the currency. Even if, conceptually, the turmoil periods are not per se cases of de facto currency 
floating, it is necessary to control for these episodes, in our optimization framework, through the flexibility 
index.  11
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flexibility indicator and the four anchor currencies are estimated recursively, as the solution 
to a standard problem of square residuals minimisation under in/equality constraints.
6 The 
optimisation technique assigns to each term on the right hand side of relation (2) a 
continuous weight between 0 and 1, and helps estimate the individual-specific mix of 
currency fixity and flexibility that a given country follows in practice. 
One important modelling option concerns the choice of the potential basket currencies, which 
in this case includes the euro, the US dollar, the British pound, and the Japanese yen. These 
four currencies are found to have played an anchoring role in different degrees during the 
past two or three decades, as shown by the various studies on the exchange rate regime and 
anchor currencies (see, for instance, the IMF exchange rate regime classifications, as well as 
Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004 and Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008).  
Prior to 1999, the euro exchange rate is proxied by the exchange rate series of the French 
franc. There are three main reasons for doing so. First, it is not possible to introduce several 
euro legacy currencies into the estimation framework. Given that their exchange rates are too 
closely correlated, this may introduce a severe multicollinearity bias into the estimations. 
Second, the alternative of introducing the exchange rate of the synthetic euro, as computed, 
inter alia at the ECB, would be problematic, as it would assign some weight to legacy 
currencies that did not play any anchoring role in the past. Third, available studies such as 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) and Meissner and Oomes (2008) show that the French franc is 
the main euro legacy currency that provided some anchoring role at the global level, 
including for the countries of the African CFA franc zone.
7 While the Deutsche mark served 
as an anchor in the exchange rate policies of some transition economies during the 1990s, 
this is, in our view, fully captured by the French franc exchange rate series. The explanation 
lies with the fact that in the 1990s, the Deutsche mark and the French franc exchange rates 
have showed almost a perfect correlation (around 0.95 over the period 1990-2008).  
The exchange rate series are first differenced to address the potential problem of non-
stationarity and multicollinearity implied by a regression on levels. The choice of SDR 
(defined as the weighted average of the four anchor currencies) as the numeraire currency 
also helps reduce the multicollinearity problem. Indeed, the pairwise correlations between the 
main variables that enter the model are negative (see Table 1), with the exception of the euro-
British pound prior to the launch of the euro in 1999 and the pairs euro-British pound and 
Japanese yen-US dollar after 1999, for which correlations are positive, but smaller than 0.6.
                                                
6 The algorithm for solving the least square problem, 
2
2 b
y Xb min − , under linear constraints on coefficients (2c-
d), involves convergence to a global optimum through iterations over two-dimension trust regions around the 
initial values of variables. In equation (3), X is a matrix of independent variables[] GBP ln d ... FLEX 1 , y the
vector of the dependent variable, 
2 the two-norm and b the vector of coefficients i.e. the solution of 
minimized square errors. 
7 Besides the CFA franc zone countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Republic of Congo, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo), there were some other countries that anchored 
their currencies at some point during the 1980s or 1990s to the French franc, including Algeria, Lao, 
Madagascar, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. 12
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Table 1: Pairwise correlations of global currencies exchange rates 















French franc             Euro          
US dollar  -0.23*           US dollar  -0.96*        
Japanese yen -0.49*  -0.68*         Japanese yen -0.58*  0.46*      
British pound 0.59*  -0.49*  -0.87*       British pound 0.33*  -0.34*  -0.72* 
Note: First difference of the log of each currency exchange rate against the SDR, * denotes statistical significance at the 
10% level. 
The estimation of exchange rate regimes encompasses a sample of 149 emerging market and 
developing economies. Out of the 141 countries, 135 countries fall under the IMF 
International Financial Statistics category of “emerging and developing economies”. Another 
9 Central and Eastern European countries that joined the European Union in 2004 and 2007, 
are added, while the 5 Asian Newly Industrialised Economies and Middle East economies 
that have graduated from emerging market economies were included in the sample. An 
overview of countries and time periods covered is provided in Appendix 1. 
The empirical estimations are conducted, as far as data availability allows, from January 
1978 to February 2010. Given that our estimations are performed over a 24-month rolling 
window, the global indicator is generated starting with January 1980. Monthly exchange 
rates against the SDR, as well as the exchange rates of the four anchor currencies, are taken 
from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics.
8 To compute the flexibility index presented 
in equation (2c), foreign exchange reserves are calculated by subtracting gold from the total 
reserves, which are also available from the IMF International Financial Statistics (line 11.d).  
III.   ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES
This study measures the exchange rate anchoring behaviour for the 149 countries in the 
sample by estimating constrained OLS regressions of the model previously described in 
equations (2a-2d). The optimisation algorithm enables us to retrieve the coefficients 
estimates as the global solution of the least square problem, over the 24-month rolling 
window. 
This section presents the results for a few salient and well-documented emerging markets and 
developing country cases (Subsection A) and provides a systematic comparison of our results 
                                                
8 We use end-of-period exchange rates against the SDR as available under code “aa” in the International 
Financial Statistics. 13
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with those of well-established de facto exchange rate regime classifications (Subsection B). 
As an additional robustness check, we apply our estimation technique to a few advanced 
economies that are not issuers of global currencies (Subsection C). 
A.   Review of selected country cases 
This subsection examines some of the individual country cases, selecting different examples 
across the spectrum of exchange rate regimes. The sample ranges from cases of hard pegs 
(Hong Kong SAR, Saudi Arabia, Lithuania) to conventional pegs against a currency or a 
composite (China, Russia), as well as some intermediate and flexible regimes (Ukraine, 
South Africa and Mexico). 
Estimates for Hong Kong SAR indicate a weight of 1 for the US dollar until 2004, in line 
with the adoption of a currency board arrangement against the US dollar since 1983. 
Furthermore, a slightly lower weight for the US dollar since 2004 reflects a certain degree of 
flexibility in the currency, with the adoption of a narrow trading band. 
The results indicate that Saudi Arabia has consistently tracked the US dollar from 1989 
onwards, with an estimated coefficient of 1 (Figure 1b). This is in line with Ilzetzki, Reinhart 
and Rogoff’s (2008) findings, and with the de facto IMF classification, which also date the 
shift to a US dollar peg in 1989. Prior to 1988, our results highlight a mix of flexibility and 
fixity vis-à-vis the US dollar. In particular, the coefficient on the US dollar is relatively high 
during 1983-1985, which is consistent with the IMF classification of a narrow crawling 
peg/band in 1983-1984, while suggesting a lower degree of commitment to the US dollar for 
the rest of the 1980s. 
The results for Lithuania suggest that the country shifted to a US dollar peg in late 1994, 
when the estimated coefficient on the US dollar increased to almost 1, and to a euro peg in 
2002 with an estimated coefficient on the euro of almost 1 (Figure 1c). These results mirror 
the IMF classification, which identifies a currency board regime from 1994 onwards.
9
                                                
9 The flexibility indicator is around 0.1 over the period 2003-2006. 14
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The estimated results for China are also consistent with the de factor regime. The estimates 
show a high level of flexibility until 1995, during the period of an intermediate exchange 
regime. However, China appears to have limited the renminbi’s fluctuations vis-à-vis the US 
dollar at certain periods during the phase of currency inconvertibility, before 1994 (see 
Figure 1d). The estimates suggest that the currency was pegged to the US dollar starting from 
1996, although this starting point of the move to a full peg regime is different from Ilzetzki, 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2008), who identify the shift as taking place two years earlier. This 
result is also different from the IMF’s de facto classification, where the renminbi is pegged 
on the US dollar starting with 1998. The results capture a decline in the weight of the US 
dollar anchor, and a small move towards limited flexibility in 2005 (i.e., the US dollar anchor 
coefficient declines from 1 in 2004 to 0.94 in 2005). These results seem to reflect China’s 
announced move to a more flexible exchange rate regime in July 2005. At the same time, 
based on our estimates, the US dollar weight in China’s exchange rate regime remained high, 
and appeared to increase again from August 2009 onwards. As of February 2010, our results 
suggest a weight on the US dollar of around 0.75, while the flexibility component is around 
0.24. 15
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In the case of Russia, the results point to quite significant shifts in the exchange rate regime 
over time (Figure 1e). Unlike the two alternative classifications, the estimates from this study 
show more fixity of the Russian rouble from the mid-1990s onwards. The US dollar anchor 
weight is considerably higher during the first part of the sample period from 1995 to 1998, 
while it falls under the freely floating category in Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008), and 
the soft peg/managed floating category, under the IMF classification. The flexibility indicator 
during the Russian crisis goes from almost zero, in September 1998, to 0.7-0.8 in the 
following two years, as the exchange rate saw significant pressure during this period--in line 
with the findings of the other two classifications. Starting with 2005, there is evidence of a 
shift away from the US dollar anchor towards a closer tracking of the euro. The US dollar 
coefficient drops from 0.84 on average in 2004 to 0.58 in 2006 and 0.37 in 2008, while the 
euro share raises from zero, on average, in 2005 to 0.33 in 2006 and 0.50 in 2008. This shift 
away from the US dollar is in line with Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008), who find that 
Russia “in principle, targets a US dollar-euro basket”, and it is also in line with Central Bank 
of Russia statements that the weight of the euro in the basket peg has been gradually 
increased over time. More recently, the estimated flexibility coefficient has increased 
sharply, peaking at 0.67 in January 2009, reflecting the impact of the global financial crisis 
on the exchange rate. 
The Ukrainian hryvnia exhibits large fluctuations in both the flexibility coefficient and the 
US dollar coefficient, in line with the two other classifications that assign the currency to 
either freely floating/falling or the soft peg/managed floating categories until 2002. Our 
results suggest a shift to a full US dollar peg in 2002, which is again consistent with the other 
two classifications. However, results from more recent period, during the global financial 
crisis, point to a small degree of currency flexibility and de-pegging from the US dollar 
standard. The flexibility coefficient increases sharply after May 2008, systematically 
exceeding 0.90 during the rest of the sample period. While the two other classifications are 
not yet available for this most recent time period, the finding seems to be in line with the 
temporary decoupling of the Ukrainian hryvnia from the US dollar and its large depreciation 
in the wake of the global financial crisis (see Figure 1f). 
The South African rand has been associated with a freely floating regime since mid-1990s. 
Estimates from our study provide similar results, with a flexibility coefficient close to 1 from 
1996 onwards. Prior to that, our estimates suggest that the currency’s degree of flexibility 
was high, roughly above 0.8, even though, at times, there is some evidence of tracking the 
US dollar (for instance, in early-1980s). This finding is in line with Ilzetzki, Reinhart and 
Rogoff’s (2008) classification according to which the currency followed a managed 
floating/dual rate regime during this period. 
To take another example, this study shows that the Mexican peso moved from a US dollar 
peg to independently floating regime at end-1994 and maintained a very high degree of 
flexibility since, with a flexibility coefficient generally above 0.8 (see Figure 1h). This 
finding coincides with Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) for the period 1994-1996, but it 
differs in later years, when the Mexican peso is classified as managed float/de facto crawling 
band vis-à-vis the US dollar. 16
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This descriptive review of selected country cases tentatively suggests that our estimation 
results are economically meaningful and broadly compatible with the established exchange 
rate regime classifications or official announcements by authorities. The estimation 
procedure also does a reasonably good job of detecting turning points, as seen through the 
sharp increase in the flexibility coefficients during the sharp depreciations of the Mexican 
peso in December 1994, the Russian rouble and the Ukrainian hryvnia in the second half of 
2008. Our methodology also picks up sudden shifts in anchor currencies, as it was the case of 
the Lithuanian Litas that moved from an US dollar to a euro peg in early-2002, or more 
nuanced shifts of exchange rate regimes, as in the case of the Chinese renminbi after July 
2005. 
There are, however, instances where the estimated results did not correspond with other 
regime classifications. In particular, the estimation methodology does not always adequately 
detect the precise degree of exchange rate anchoring in the case of intermediate regimes. The 
results for the Mexican peso provide an illustration of this issue, where the estimates show a 
considerable degree of flexibility, while other classifications point to a managed float. This 
result is perhaps not surprising given the very nature of intermediate regimes, and the 
difficulties generally encountered in the literature in classifying them accordingly. In some 
other limited cases, the methodology in this study is unable to disentangle uncontrolled 
exchange rate depreciations (“freely falling” episodes) and intended and well-controlled 
parity revaluations. 
Finally, the equivalence between our continuously estimated betas and other de facto regimes 
classifications, based on different estimation techniques, is not necessarily linear, as the 
coefficients come from an optimisation procedure. Therefore there may be thresholds in our 
coefficients estimates above or below which they fall more easily under the hard peg or free 
floating/falling extreme categories.  
B.   A systematic comparison of our results with other classifications 
A systematic comparison of this study with available exchange classifications is not 
straightforward. Our study provides a continuous ordering of the exchange rate regime and is 
therefore “richer” than other classifications, which offer only a discrete measure of such 
ordering. To compare results, we have to reduce the information content of our estimated 
exchange rate regimes by transforming our continuous classification into a discrete one and 
make some ad hoc assumptions on the cut-off values. This is a partly arbitrary exercise, as 
the coefficient thresholds for narrow crawling peg/band and soft peg/managed floating in the 
sense of harmonised Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) and IMF de facto classifications 
are difficult to identify. Nevertheless, we identify four broad groups of exchange rate 
regimes, in line with the two above mentioned classifications, by applying the following 
conditions on the continuous coefficient estimates: 
hard peg: one of the anchor currency coefficient is larger than 0.9, i.e.  4 , 1 , 9 . 0 , = ≥ k k i β17
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This category includes cases of no separate legal tender, pre announced peg or currency 
board arrangement, pre announced horizontal band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2% as 
well as de facto pegs according to the Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) and de facto IMF 
classifications.  
narrow crawling peg or band: the flexibility coefficient is between 0.1 and 0.5, i.e. 
5 . 0 1 . 0 , < ≤ FLEX i β
The equivalent discrete regimes which fall into the second category are pre announced 
crawling pegs, pre announced crawling bands narrower than or equal to +/-2%, de facto 
crawling pegs and de facto crawling bands narrower than or equal to +/-2%. 
soft peg or managed floating: the flexibility coefficient is between 0.5 and 0.9, i.e. 
9 . 0 5 . 0 , < ≤ FLEX i β
The third category includes the pre announced crawling bands wider than or equal to +/-2%, 
de facto crawling bands narrower than or equal to +/-5%, moving band narrower than or 
equal to +/-2% (i.e., that allows for both appreciation and depreciation over time) as well as 
the managed floating regimes. 
freely floating or freely falling regime: the flexibility coefficient exceeds 0.9,  9 . 0 , ≥ FLEX i β
The fourth category includes the freely floating, freely falling regimes as well as the cases of 
dual market in which parallel market data is missing.  
For robustness checks, the four classes can be further grouped into hard/conventional pegs, 
intermediate and flexible regimes by merging categories (2) and (3).  
Table 2 reports the results of two nonparametric measures of association (Spearman and 
Kendall tau-b correlation coefficients
10) based on the ranks of the de facto regimes identified 
by the three methodologies. The regimes are grouped in either four or three equivalent 
categories according to their degree of fixity, from the most rigid (that falls into the low 
category) to most flexible (that falls into the upper category) of the spectrum.  
Table 2: Pairwise rank correlation coefficients (End-2007, 119 countries) 
    Our study, IRR 
(1) 




Spearman   4 classes  0.58*  0.49*  0.64* 
 3  classes  0.58*  0.49*  0.61* 
10 The Kendall tau-b correlation coefficient is adjusted for ties (Kendall, 1970) and based on the number of 
concordances and discordances in paired observations that makes it sometimes preferred to Spearman rank 
correlation as it does estimate a population parameter. 18
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Kendall's tau-b  4 classes  0.50*  0.43*  0.59* 
 3  classes  0.54*  0.45*  0.59* 
Notes: * denotes significance at 5% level; IRR denotes Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) and IMF, the IMF de facto 
classification. 
Columns (1) and (2) present the rank correlation coefficients between our study and the other 
two well established classifications. Both Spearman and Kendall tau-b correlation 
coefficients, adjusted or not for ties, show a higher concordance of our results with the 
Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) natural classification (in the range of 0.5 –0.6) than 
with the IMF de facto classification (around 0.4).
11 At the same time, it is worth noting that 
the correlation between the two studies is not particularly high (around 0.6, reported in the 
Column (3) of Table 2).  
C.   Robustness check: Results for advanced economies 
As a further robustness check we apply our estimation technique to selected advanced 
economies other than the issuers of global currencies and compare our results with the two 
alternative classifications (IMF and Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008). Overall, the model 
provides satisfactory results (see Figures 2a-e).  
In the case of the Australian dollar, the estimated weight of the flexibility component was 
almost 1 for the period for which data is available (i.e., starting with 1993), with the 
exception of 1997-98 during the Asian crisis and in the second half of 2000s, when the 
currency showed a correlation of around 0.2 with the Japanese yen.  
Another typical example of fully flexible exchange rate according to the IMF, the Canadian 
dollar shows an estimated degree of flexibility of almost 1 during the last three decades. By 
contrast, Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) find that a moving band around the US dollar 
would be more in line with the regime effectively followed by the Canadian dollar over the 
last three decades.  
From mid-1980s onward, the Icelandic krona has been officially pegged to a basket of 
currencies with the ECU/euro playing a preponderant role (more than ¾). In practice, the 
regime effectively followed by the monetary authorities has been classified by the IMF as a 
facto peg around the Deutsche mark until 1997; with more flexibility progressively being 
allowed to the currency (managed floating up to 2001 followed by freely floating). However, 
for Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) the regime followed by Iceland is a more 
intermediate one, without big regime shifts: a crawling band around the Deutsche mark until 
2000 followed by managed floating. Our results tend to suggest that during the 4-year period 
before the launch of the euro, Iceland maintained a conventional peg in which the euro’s 
legacy currencies accounted for around 39% on the average. During more recent period 
11 There is a case where  1 . 0 FLEX , i < β  but there is not only one currency (hard peg on a basket): this is taken into 
account as soft peg but including it as narrow crawling peg/band does not affect the rank correlation results.  19
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(2003-2005) the currency seemed to still track the euro (for around 16% on the average), but 
overall the currency is characterized by a large degree of flexibility. 





















































































































































































































































































































The Swedish krona followed, according to the IMF classification, a fixed exchange rate 
regime until 1994 when more flexibility was allowed to the currency, under the form of 
managed floating up to 2001 and freely floating after that date. Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2008) classify the regime as a de facto crawling band around the Deutsche mark until the 
EMS crisis and as a flexible regime since the beginning of the 1990s. The results from this 
study suggest that the currency was indeed pegged to the euro’s legacy currencies up to 1993, 
and tracked the euro to a certain extent in late 1990s, but overall, the Swedish krona seems to 
have followed a flexible exchange regime over the last decade.  
The Swiss Franc is another interesting case as it plays, along with the Japanese yen, a role of 
safe haven currency. The Swiss Franc is freely floating according to the IMF de facto 
classification, although Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) classify it as a de facto soft peg 
that has tracked the Deutsche mark/euro fluctuations within a moving band from 1981 
onwards. Our estimation results point to a limited role for the euro as anchor for the Swiss 
Franc (weight in the range 0.1- 0.2 since mid-1995), with the exception of 2005-2007 when 
the weight of the euro increased to around 0.4.  
IV.   GLOBAL INDICATOR OF EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES
To compute a global indicator of exchange rate regimes, this study aggregates individual 
country results for emerging and developing countries. As a first attempt at constructing such 20
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a global indicator, we count the number of countries that chose a given exchange rate anchor 
currency in a given year. For the construction of such a “count-based” indicator, countries are 
assigned to either a fixed or a floating regime over time, according to the importance of the 
main currencies and/of flexibility indicator in determining their exchange rate trajectory. 
Using a 0.5 cut-off for either the main currencies or the degree of flexibility we classify a 
given currency as dominantly following either one or another of the bipolar regimes.  
Figure 3 illustrates the evolution of the number of emerging and developing countries 
assigned to the euro and US-dollar pegs, or to a flexible exchange rate regime, based on this 
criterion. Overall, it is difficult to disentangle, over time, the observed gradual trend toward 
bipolar regimes and the general increase in the total number of countries. For instance, in the 
case of the euro, at end-1998, there were 18 countries that had chosen it as main anchor 
currency, compared to 20 in early-2010. For the US dollar the number of countries has been 
rather stable throughout the 1990s, but it dropped rather strongly during the last years, from 
around 50 in 2007 to 30 in early-2010.  
Figure 3: Number of countries with  
predominantly fixed or floating exchange 
rate regimes*  
Figure 4: Trade-weighted global indicator 


















































































































































































































Euro US dollar Japanese yen
British pound Independent float
*Anchor currency or independent floating weights of at least 0.5 respectively. 
Beyond the artificial translation of continuous weight into a discrete measure, the main 
caveat to the previous method is the fact that countries are treated equally when they are 
assigned to a given category. Thus the information conveyed by a categorical approach may 
not be useful to assess the global role of currencies.  
To deal with this caveat, we aggregate individual country results into a trade-weighted global 
indicator of the exchange rate regime choice. More precisely, the weight assigned to each 
currency is the share of its imports and exports in total world trade. In order to disentangle 21
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the volume effects stemming from the changing patterns of trade over the last four decades
12
and those coming from changes in the anchor currency, or in the degree of flexibility per se, 
we impose that the trade shares across the group of emerging and developing countries add 
up to one. The evolution of the global indicator is illustrated on Figure 4. 
The results convey, at the global level, some important features on the long trends in the 
share of the main anchor currencies. On a trade-weight basis, over the period 1999-2010, the 
euro’s weight as an anchor currency has maintained relatively stable, at around 7.5%. There 
was some volatility during the recent global financial crisis, as weight of the euro as anchor 
currency picked up to around 10% during 2008, and subsequently returned to around 6% by 
early-2010.  
The role of the US dollar as anchor currency proved to be relatively volatile over the past 
decades. Its weight in the exchange rate configurations of emerging and developing countries 
hovered around 50% over the past 30 years, but with some volatility and notable troughs in 
the late-1980s, the mid-1990s, the late-1990s and the end of the last decade (2008 and 2009). 
These troughs in the US dollar’s global role as an anchor currency appear to coincide broadly 
with periods of crisis or stress in the global financial system, forcing some countries to 
abandon their pegs to the US dollar (e.g., the emerging market crises of the mid-1990s and 
late-1990s, as well as the recent global financial crisis). After each of these crisis episodes, 
however, the US dollar appeared to consistently re-establish its global anchoring role.  
The role of the British pound declined over time, from mid-1990s levels of around 4% to 
roughly 2% over the period 1999-2010. The trade-weighted share of the Japanese yen, 
although very volatile, was around 3% on average over 1999-2010. At the same time, the 
share of independent floating regimes weighted by countries’ trade has fluctuated 
considerably, as has mainly mirrored the fluctuations in the global weight of the US dollar. 
Similar indexes may be computed at the regional level in order to capture potentially 
different patterns in the evolution of anchor currency choices. Their evolution, in selected 
regions, is illustrated on Figures 5a-e.  
As expected, the role of global currencies has been quite heterogeneous across regions. If we 
focus on the last decade since the launch of the euro, on average, the single currency 
accounted for 2% in emerging Asia and the Middle East, 3% in Latin America, 5% in the 
CIS and 26% in Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs). The regional distribution 
of the US dollar as anchor currency shows even larger discrepancies. Over the same period, 
the US dollar accounted on average for 7% in the CEECs, 32% in Latin America, 62% in 
Asia, 63% in the CIS and 83% in the Middle East. Mirroring these trends, the weight of de 
facto flexibility was only 13% on average in the Middle East countries, 23% in the CIS, 34% 
in emerging Asia and considerably higher, around 59 and 62% in Latin America and the 
CEECs respectively. In terms of trends over time, and focusing on the most recent years, the 
12 The share of emerging and developing countries in total world trade has evolved from 30% at the beginning 
of the 1980s, to 20% at the time of the early 1990s recession and has systematically risen to around 40% in 
2009.  22
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1353
June 2011
most notable changes were observed in Latin America and the CIS, as in both regions the 
importance of floating currencies increased strongly during the global crisis of 2008-2009. 
This appears to reflect the (partly forced, partly voluntary) abandoning of fixed exchange rate 
regimes in some countries. 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































V.   WHAT DRIVES THE EVOLUTION OF THE ANCHOR CURRENCY WEIGHTS?
We now try to explain, at the group level, the determinants of the degree of fixity, estimated 
above, vis-à-vis the four global currencies, on a monthly basis over 1980-2010. Similar to 
Meissner and Oomes (2008), we take into account as explanatory variables the network 
effects stemming from trade, as well as the currency denomination of debt. 
Trade relations are measured by bilateral exports and imports between each emerging and 
developed country and the four main countries/regions issuing global currencies, provided on 
a monthly basis by the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics. Data on the currency composition 
of external debt are from the World Bank Global Development Finance, which contains data 
for the emerging market countries that report public and publicly guaranteed debt under the 
Debtor Reporting System. Data are available on an annual basis and linearly interpolated to 
obtain a time series with monthly frequency for the regressions. In the end, we retain 119 
emerging and developing countries for which data is available.  
This choice of determinants reflects the idea that emerging and developed countries are 
assigning a higher weight to anchor currencies if they trade more and borrow more with the 
country issuing the anchor currency. To avoid scaling problems, for each anchor currency 
specification, we use the shares of trade and long-term debt in total trade and long-term debt 
of each country in the sample with the anchor currency. We also include regional dummies to 
capture other considerations than trade and debt denomination that may affect the choice of 
an anchor currency. 23
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Given the nature of our explanatory variables, i.e. the betas as estimated above which are 
bounded between 0 and 1, a double-censored pooled tobit specification seems the most 
appropriate (Model 1):  












+ + + + + =
1 ˆ if , 1
1 ˆ 0 if , ˆ
0 ˆ if , 0
ˆ ˆ
MiddleEast _ dummy CIS _ dummy CEECs _ dummy
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ε γ γ γ
γ γ γ γ γ β
    
(4a) 
where  ict β ˆ  denotes the uncensored vector of reference currency weights previously estimated 
for each currency c=1,4 (euro, US dollar, Japanese yen and British pound),  ict Trade the share 
of trade with the country/region issuing the anchor currency c in total trade of country i,
ict LTDebt  the share of long-term debt denominated in currency c in total long-term external 
debt of country i, i Africa dummy _ ,...,  i MiddleEast dummy _  the regional dummies
13 that 
equal 1 if country i belongs to a given region and 0 otherwise,  c 0 γ ,…, c 7 γ the tobit regression 
coefficients and ic ε the associated vector of disturbances.  
At the outset, it should be noted that our specification may be subject to an endogeneity bias 
leading to inconsistent coefficient estimates. More precisely, the reverse causality, i.e., the 
fact that the currency denomination of debt and trade patterns may be influenced by the 
anchor currency choice has already been documented in the empirical literature.  
First, a large and positive impact of the exchange rate regime (or the exchange rate 
variability) on trade flows was put forward in the case of currency unions, unilateral 
dollarisation and currency board arrangements by Rose (2000), Engel and Rose (2000), 
Alesina, Barro and Tenreyro (2002)
14. More recently, Adam and Cobham (2007) study the 
effect of de facto exchange rate, in the sense of Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), on bilateral 
trade. They find that currency unions and more generally all the regimes that reduce the 
exchange rate uncertainty and transaction costs related to international trade are more “pro-
trade” than managed and freely floating exchange rate regimes.  
Second, the reverse causality stemming from the debt variable would imply that the share of 
debt denominated in a given currency is influenced by the degree of fixity vis-à-vis that 
currency. In the literature on the determinants of currency mismatches in the balance sheets 
of emerging and developing countries, the exchange rate policy and, in particular, fixed 
13 The Latin America group is the reference group; therefore the dummy is not included in the specification. 
14 See Baldwin (2005) for a literature review. 24
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exchange rate regimes tend to encourage the accumulation of foreign currency-denominated 
debt. As shown by Martinez and Werner (2001) on the example of Mexico before the 1994-
95 crisis, when the exchange rate had a predetermined path, there are little incentives on the 
side of the domestic borrowers to fully hedge the exchange rate risk. Instead, fixed exchange 
rate regimes provide an implicit insurance thus lowering the cost of borrowing in foreign 
currency. Arteta (2003) challenges this view by showing that liability dollarisation can also 
be encouraged by floating exchange rate regimes as hedging may become too costly in 
presence of highly volatile exchange rates and/or insufficient developed financial markets. 
More recently, using detailed micro-level data on the currency composition of firms’ balance 
sheets in seven Latin American countries over the period 1992-2005, Kamil (2006) shows 
that more exchange rate flexibility tends to be associated with lower levels of unhedged 
foreign currency denominated debt.  
This endogeneity problem can be addressed through the use of instrumental variables, either 
internal or external to the model. The larger the difference between initial and corrected 
coefficients, the more important the endogeneity bias. As an external correction is more 
likely to provide better results in reducing the endogeneity bias than a lagged structure, we 
develop an instrumentalvariables (IV) approach in a two-stage tobit setting (Model 2). These
estimators solve the endogeneity problem by instrumenting the potentially endogenous 
regressors (shares of trade and debt) using exogenous variables as instruments.  
In a first step, we estimate gravity models of trade and debt shares on a set of instruments 
standard in the empirical literature in order to get estimated trade and debt shares according 
to other criteria than the choice of the anchor currency.  
Extensively used to explain the determinants of bilateral trade flows, the basic gravity model 
relates, by analogy to gravity laws in physics, bilateral trade between two countries to their 
size and to the distance between them. Given the specificity of our explained variable, for 
each country (i) and anchor currency (c), we use the real growth ( c ict rYdiff − / ) and the per 
capita GDP differentials ( c ct PCGDPdiff − / ) among countries issuing the anchor currencies to 
proxy for the size effect, i.e. the fact that emerging and developing countries will choose to 
trade more with a relatively faster growing and richer economy/region. Trading costs are 
proxied by the geographical ( ic dist ) and cultural distance (colonial past ic COL ) between 
emerging and developing countries and a given anchor country. These variables are 
computed as the difference between the anchor currency and the arithmetic mean of the three 
other anchor currencies. 
Finally, we include the share of debt denominated in the anchor currency in total long-term 
debt to capture complementarities between trade and financial flows that may also influence 
the costs of trade (see Shin and Yang, 2006): 
Gravity model of Trade 
For each country i and global currency c, at time t: 
c ic c ict c ic ic c ct ic c ct ic ict COL Debt dist PCGDPdiff rYdiff Trade + + + + + + = − − 5 4 3 2 / 1 / 0 δ δ δ δ δ δ
  (5a)25
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The debt shares are instrumented using a gravity model similar to the ones used to explain 
cross-border financial flows. As shown by Martin and Rey (2004), Faruqee, Li and Yan 
(2004), bilateral asset holdings can be explained, similar to trade flows, by the size of the 
market, transaction and information costs in addition to the expected return on assets.
15 Our 
specification will thus include, apart from real growth rate ( ict Ydiff ) and per capita income 
differentials ( ict PCGDPdiff ) between the country that issues the currency of choice and the 
other main currencies, the relative geographical ( ic dist ) and cultural distance ( ict COL ), debt 
and trade complementarities as well as proxies for the effective cost of debt (interest rate 
differentials ( ct idiff ) and bilateral exchange rates of anchor currencies ( c ct FX − / )). As in the 
case of the gravity model of trade, the differential variables for each anchor currency are 
computed relative to the arithmetic average of the other three anchor currencies. 
Gravity model of Debt  
For each country i and global currency c, at time t: 
ict
k
kc c ct c c ct
c ict c ict c ic c c ct c c ct ic ict
v FX idiff
COL Trade dist PCGDPdiff rYdiff Debt
+ + +








5 4 3 2 / 1 / 0
λ λ
λ λ λ λ λ λ
  (5b)
We denote the estimated shares of trade and debt from the two gravity models by  de a Trˆ and
bt e LTDˆ .
In a second step, we perform pooled tobit estimations of equation (4a) on the beta 
coefficients using the estimated values of trade and debt shares instead of initial ones.  
Model 2:For each country i and global currency c, at time t: 
ict ic i
ic i ic ict ic ict ic ict
MiddleEast dummy
Asia dummy bt e LTD de a Tr
ε γ
γ γ γ γ β
+ +
+ + + + =
7
3 2 1 0
_ ...
... _ ˆ ˆ ˆ   (4b)
As far as the data sources for the gravity models are concerned, real growth rate, per capita 
nominal GDP, and bilateral exchange rates are taken from the IMF International Financial 
Statistics (lines 99BVPZF, 99b/99Z and rf respectively). Long-term interest rates are the 10-
year benchmark government bond yields provided by Haver Analytics for the US, Japan and 
the UK whereas for the euro area long-term interest rates, we used a synthetic measure 
computed at the ECB. Finally, the relative distance to the anchor currency country is 
computed based on the great circle distance between capital cities (“as the crow flies”) a 
common measure in the empirical literature on the determinants of bilateral trade and 
financial flows.  
                                                
15 See also Portes and Rey (2005) and Shin and Yang (2006) on the role of geographical and cultural distance in explaining 
financial transactions. 26
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Table 3: Determinants of anchor currencies: The case of the euro 
Model 1 / pooled tobit  Model 2 / IV tobit 
(based on gravity equations) 
1a)   1b)  2a)   2b) 
Share of trade_euro area  0.49***(0.01)   0.48***(0.01)   0.36*** (0.03)   0.27*** (0.03)  
Debt denomination_euro  0.80***(0.01)  0.73***(0.01)  2.05*** (0.07)   1.70*** (0.07)  
Africa  0.08***(0.00)   0.11***  (0.00)   
Asia   -0.04***(0.00)    -0.04***(0.00) 
CEECs   -0.10***(0.01)    0.10***(0.01)   
CIS   -0.20***(0.01)    -0.16***(0.01) 
Latin America    REF    REF 
Middle East    -0.19***(0.00)    -0.16***(0.01) 
_const  -0.33***(0.00)   -0.31***(0.00)  -0.50*** (0.00)   -0.42***(0.01)  
Number of obs.  32,972  32,972  18,912  18,912 
No of uncensored obs  20,334  20,334  11,171  11,171 
left-censored 12,105 12,105 7,345  7,345 
right-censored 533  533  396  396 
Notes: Specifications 1a) and 2a) do not take into account regional aspects; regional dummies are included in specifications 
1b) and 2b); * denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%,*** denotes significance at 1%; robust std. errors 
between brackets 
Tables 3 and 4 report the estimation results for the euro and US dollar respectively.
16 The 
first two columns present the estimation results of Model 1 (pooled tobit), with and without 
regional dummies while the third and fourth columns refer to Model 2 (IV approach) that 
corrects for the endogeneity bias through the estimation of gravity equations for trade and 
debt. The results of the first-step of the IV approach (i.e. the estimation of the gravity 
equations for trade and debt, relations 5a-b) for the four anchor currencies, are reported in 
Appendix 2 (Tables A2.1-4).  
In the case of the euro shares (Table 3), the coefficients of the share of trade with the euro 
area and euro- denominated debt are statistically significant and enter with expected positive 
sign across the two specifications. The small difference between pooled tobit and the IV 
approach results for trade show that there is only a limited endogeneity bias coming from 
trade that is likely to distort the initial results.  
The result implies, for instance, in the case of a country pegging on a currency basket with 
variable composition, that if the euro trade share increases by 1 p.p., the country is more 
likely to increase the importance of the euro in the currency basket by 0.5 p.p., at the expense 
of other currencies in the basket. The coefficient for debt denomination looks less stable 
though. Indeed, after correcting for two-way causality in the relation between anchor 
currency choice and the choice of currency of denomination of external debt, network effects 
from the denomination of external debt seem to play a bigger role in driving the preference 
for the euro anchor. The regional effects also have a role to play, with Africa and CEECs 
being characterised by higher levels- and CIS and Middle East countries by lower levels- 
than the reference group (Latin America), independent of the amount of trade with the euro 
area or the amount of euro denominated debt.  
                                                
16 Results for the Japanese yen and the British pound are not reported.  27
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Table 4: Determinants of anchor currencies: The case of the US dollar 
Model 1 / pooled tobit  Model 2 / IV tobit 
(based on gravity equations) 
1a)   1b)  2a)   2b) 
Share of trade_US  0.63*** (0.01)  0.05*** (0.01)  0.06  (0.06)   0.50*** (0.06)  
Debt denomination_USD  0.41*** (0.01)  0.20*** (0.01)  1.87*** (0.11)   -1.04*** (0.11)  
Africa   -0.54***  (0.00)   -0.65***  (0.01) 
Asia   -0.36***  (0.00)   -0.43***  (0.01)   
CEECs   -0.48***  (0.01)   -0.63***  (0.01) 
CIS   -0.19***  (0.01)   -0.25***  (0.01) 
Latin  America   REF   REF 
Middle East    0.06*** (0.01)     0.18*** (0.01) 
_const  -0.12*** (0.00)   0.50*** (0.01)  -1.03*** (0.06)   1.33*** (0.07)  
Number of obs.  32,972  32,972  18,912  18,912 
No of uncensored obs.  24,549  24,549  13,757  13,757 
left-censored 6,118  6,118  4,072  4,072 
right-censored 2,305  2,305  1,083  1,083 
Notes: Specifications 1a) and 2a) do not take into account regional aspects; regional dummies are included in specifications 
1b) and 2b); * denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, *** denotes significance at 1%; robust std. errors 
between brackets. 
Turning now to the determinants of pegging on the US dollar, the effects stemming from 
trade with the US and US dollar-denominated debt are smaller than their equivalent for the 
euro pegs. At the same time, as the results reported in Table 4 tend to suggest, regional 
aspects are likely to play a larger role, than in the case of the euro, in driving the preference 
for a US dollar peg. Middle East countries are characterised by a slightly higher level of US 
dollar share than the reference group, independently of the amounts of trade and debt. 
Conversely, regions like the CEECs, Africa, and to a lower extent, Asia and the CIS, exhibit 
a smaller level of US dollar pegging than what can be explained by trade and finance 
network effects. Endogeneity also plagues our initial estimation and after correcting for it, 
the role of trade and debt seem to be significantly lower. 
Finally, as a robustness check, but also in order to detect potential shifts over time in the 
patterns of trade, debt and regional considerations, we run the pooled tobit estimation (Model 
1) on two sub-periods, before and after the launch of the euro in 1999. The results for the 
euro and US dollar shares are reported in Tables 5-6. Appendix 2 (Tables A2.5-6) contains 
the results for the British pound and the Japanese yen. 
Overall, network effects coming from trade and finance as well as regional aspects help 
explaining the anchor currency choice during the two sub-periods. Even if their importance 
may have shifted, there is no indication of a break in the relationship over time, related to the 
introduction of the euro.  28
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Table 5: Outcome of pooled tobit estimations before and after 1999_Euro shares 
  Model 1/pooled tobit  Model 2/ IV tobit 
(based on gravity equations) 





















































































Latin  America    REF  REF      REF  REF 

























Number of obs.  20,562  12,410  20,562  12,410  34,579  12362  20549  12362 
uncensored  obs.  12,825  7,509 12,825 7,509 14376  8068  14376  8068 
left-censored  7,459 4,646 6,418  4,646 4553  3760  4553  3760 
right-censored  278 255 309  255 1620  534  1620  534 
Chow test   89.45 [0.00]***  306.34  [0.00]***  151.68 [0.00]***  516.59[0.00]*** 
Notes: Pooled tobit specifications 1a) and 2a) do not take into account regional aspects; regional dummies are included in 
specifications 1b) and 2b) specifications; * denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, *** denotes 
significance at 1%; robust std. errors between brackets; The outcome of a Chow test for coefficients equality is reported. 
In the case of the euro (Table 5), there is evidence of an increased role for trade with the euro 
area, over the second sub-period, in motivating the adoption of a euro peg. There also seems 
to be a larger interest in euro pegs over the second period from regions like CEECs and 
Africa, compared to CIS and Middle East that shifted more to US dollar pegs. As far as Asia 
is concerned, while the regional dummy coefficient for the US dollar is slightly higher over 
the second sub-period, there is no significant change in the case of the euro share.  
Regarding the evolution of the main determinants of US dollar pegs (see Table 6), after 
taking into account regional aspects, the role of trade appears unchanged while the role of 
debt becomes more important over the period from 1999 to present. At the regional level, 
Middle East and CIS countries seem to have shifted to US dollar for considerations other 
than trade and debt denomination. In the case of CEECs and Africa, there is no indication of 
such shift one decade ago, that cannot be attributed to higher trade with the euro area or to 
the use of debt instruments denominated in euros. 29
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Table 6: Outcome of pooled tobit estimations before and after 1999_US dollar shares 
  Model 1/pooled tobit  Model 2/ IV tobit 
(based on gravity equations) 




















































































Latin America      REF  REF      REF  REF 
























Number of obs.  20,562  12,410  20,562  12,410  20549  12362  20549  12362 
uncensored obs.  15,493  9,056  15,493  9,056  14376  8068  14376  8068 
left-censored 3,364  2,754  3,364  2,754  4553  3760  4553  3760 
right-censored 1,705    600  1,705  600  1620  534  1620  534 
Chow test   114.82 [0.00]***  545.34 [0.00]***  151.68 [0.00]***  516.59[0.00]*** 
Notes: Pooled tobit specifications 1a) and 2a) do not take into account regional aspects; regional dummies are included in 
specifications 1b) and 2b) specifications; * denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, *** denotes 
significance at 1%; robust std. errors between brackets; The outcome of a Chow test for coefficients equality is reported. 
To conclude, we find that network effects stemming from trade and finance, as well as 
regional effects, explain the role of euro and US dollar as anchor currencies for emerging and 
developing economies. There has been some change over time, particularly in the case of the 
euro, with trade relations becoming increasingly important. In the case of the US dollar, debt 
related aspects seem to matter more, over the last decade, in driving the anchor currency 
choice. Regional aspects have remained broadly stable, except for the CEECs and Middle 
East countries, more biased toward the euro and US dollar respectively, at same levels of 
trade and debt as the other regions. These findings are actually in line with the stylised facts 
reviewed in Subsection 3.1, of shifts in the anchor currency, from SDR basket or solely US 
dollar peg to an euro peg in the CEECs region (e.g., Lithuania) or to the gradual move to a 
full peg on the US dollar for some Middle East countries (e.g., Saudi Arabia) over the last 
decade.  30
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VI.   CONCLUSION
This study extends the Frankel and Wei (2008) methodology to estimate the exchange rate 
anchoring behaviour in a sample of 149 emerging and developing economies, tracking 
changes over time during the period 1980-2010. Robustness checks based on individual 
country results show a high degree of correlation of our results with the equivalent discrete 
de facto classifications of Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) and the IMF.  
The study constructs an aggregate trade-weighted global indicator of exchange rate regime 
choice to capture the role of the global currencies and their long-term trends in the evolution 
of the exchange rates of selected emerging market and developing countries. The overall 
results suggest that the US dollar has over the past three decades maintained a clear leading 
role as an important exchange rate anchor currency, with a trade-weighted share of around 
50% on average. On a trade-weighted basis, the shares of the euro and the Japanese yen are 
far smaller, at around 7.5% and 3%, respectively, whereas the share of the British pound has 
virtually vanished over the last decade compared to earlier periods. 
Over time, there have been some important fluctuations in the anchoring role of currencies, 
mainly of the US dollar. Especially around the times of global financial crisis such as the 
Asian crisis of the late-1990s, some emerging and developing economies appear to have 
temporarily abandoned (partly voluntary, partly forced) US dollar pegs, but in general the US 
dollar re-established itself quickly as the leading anchoring currency after each crisis episode. 
Also during the recent global financial crisis 2008-2009, the US dollar lost some of its 
anchoring role, as some large emerging market economies (e.g. Russia) were forced to 
temporarily abandon their exchange rate targets. Whether the US dollar’s leading anchoring 
role will re-emerge to pre-crisis levels remains to be seen and cannot be answered yet with 
the analysis in this study.  
The paper finds that network effects related to trade and currency denomination of debt play 
a significant role in determining the anchor currency weights. The empirical analysis points 
to a significant role, especially in the case of the euro, for “transaction motives”, i.e., trade 
linkages and external debt denomination. As for the US dollar, regional factors also have a 
strong influence on the choice of the anchor currency. There is some evidence, following the 
launch of the euro in 1999, of an increasing role of trade relations in explaining the euro 
share, while an increasing role of debt denomination in explaining the US dollar share.  
The results of the study have some important policy implications. The “US dollar block” 
within the emerging and developing country sphere has over the past decades remained very 
strong and important, despite temporary decouplings from the US dollar around the time of 
crises (e.g., Asian crisis). This appears to confirm the global relevance of the fear of floating 
argument and implies that the room for independent monetary policy conduct remains limited 
in the emerging and developing countries as a group. Also, as a result, global exchange rate 
configurations continue to be characterised by an element of inflexibility, as the lack of 
adjustment of some leading emerging and developing country currencies vis-à-vis the US 
dollar may complicate the adjustment of global trade imbalances.  31
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VIII.   APPENDIX 1.COUNTRY AVAILABILITY
The countries listed below were included in the main analysis of de fact anchor currency 
choice and the construction of aggregate indicators. Data are available on a monthly basis 
from January 1978 to December 2008 unless otherwise stated. The asterisk denotes the 
countries included in the analysis of the determinants of the degree of pegging on a global 
currency (Section 5).  
Emerging market and developing economies: Albania* (Jan. 1994-) Algeria*, Angola* 
(Jan. 1996-), Antigua and Barbuda (Feb. 1979-), Argentina*, Armenia* (Jan. 1993-), 
Azerbaijan* (Apr. 1993-), The Bahamas, Bahrain (- Feb. 2005), Bangladesh*, Barbados, 
Belarus* (Jan. 1995-), Belize*, Benin* (-Oct. 2008), Bhutan (Jan1984- Jan. 2008), Bolivia*, 
Botswana (-Nov. 2008), Bosnia and Herzegovina* (Sep.1997-), Brazil*, Brunei Darussalam 
(Jan. 2000- Nov. 2008), Burkina Faso* (-Oct. 2008), Burundi*, Cambodia* (Jan1994-), 
Cameroon*, Cape Verde* (Apr. 1978-), Chad*, Chile*, China* (Aug. 1980-), Colombia*, 
Comoros* (Jan. 1981-), Dem. Rep. of Congo* (-Sep. 2008), Rep. of Congo*, Costa Rica*, 
Côte d’Ivoire* (-Oct. 2008), Croatia* (Jan. 1993-), Djibouti* (Jan. 1985- Sep. 2008), 
Dominica* (Feb. 1979-), Dominican Republic*, Ecuador* (-Apr2000), Egypt* (-Jul. 2008), 
El Salvador*, Equatorial Guinea* (Jan. 1983-), Eritrea (Jan. 1996- Nov. 2008), Ethiopia*, 
Fiji* (-Oct. 2006), Gabon* (Mar. 1978-), The Gambia* (-Mar. 2008), Georgia* (Nov. 1995-), 
Ghana* (-Apr. 2007), Grenada*, Guatemala*, Guinea* (Aug. 1991- Sep. 2006), Guinea-
Bissau* (Feb. 1987- Oct. 2008), Guyana*, Haiti*, Honduras* (-Nov. 2008), India*, 
Indonesia*, Iraq (Jan. 2005- Dec. 2006), Jamaica*, Jordan* (-Sep. 2008), Kazakhstan* (Dec. 
1993-), Kenya*, Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic* (Jan. 1994), PDR Lao* (Jan. 1989- May. 2008), 
Lebanon*, Lesotho (Feb. 1980- May 2007), Liberia* (-Apr. 2008), Libya, Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia*, (Jan. 1994-), Madagascar*, Malawi* (-Oct. 2008), Malaysia*, 
Maldives* (Feb. 1981-), Mali* (-Oct. 2008), Mauritania* (-Jun. 2008), Mauritius*, Mexico*, 
Moldova* (Apr1992), Mongolia* (Jan. 1993- Mar. 2008), Morocco*, Rep. of Mozambique* 
(Apr. 1984- Aug. 2008), Myanmar* (-Jun. 2007), Namibia (Feb. 1992-), Nepal* (-May. 
2006), Nicaragua*, Niger* (-Oct. 2008), Nigeria* (-Sep. 2008), Oman*, Pakistan*, Panama* 
(-Apr. 2008), Papua New Guinea* (-Nov. 2008), Paraguay*, Peru*, Philippines*, Qatar, 
Russia* (Jan. 1994-), Rwanda*, Samoa*, São Tomé and Príncipe* (Sep. 1995-), Saudi 
Arabia, Senegal* (-Oct. 2008), Seychelles* (Jan. 1979), Sierra Leone* (-Nov. 2008), 
Solomon Islands* (-Nov. 2008), South Africa*, Sri Lanka* (-Nov. 2008), St. Kitts and 
Nevis* (Feb. 1981-), St. Lucia* (Feb. 1979-), St. Vincent and the Grenadines* (Feb. 1979-), 
Sudan*, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic* (-Jun. 1989), Tajikistan* (Feb. 1997- 
Nov. 2007), Tanzania* (-Nov. 2008), Thailand*, Dem. Rep. of Timor-Leste (Aug. 2002-), 
Togo* (-Oct. 2008), Tonga*, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia*, Turkey*, Uganda*, Ukraine* 
(Jan. 1993-), United Arab Emirates (-Nov. 2008), Uruguay*, Vanuatu* (Feb. 1981-), 
Venezuela (-Sep. 2008), Vietnam* (Feb. 1995-), Yemen (Jun. 1990-), Zambia*, Zimbabwe* 
(-Dec. 2002).  
New EU member states: Bulgaria* (Jan. 1992-), Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Estonia 
(Jul.1992-), Hungary* (Jan. 1984), Latvia* (Aug. 1993-), Lithuania* (Jan. 1993-), Poland* 
(Jan. 1985-), Romania* (Feb. 1979-) 
Former emerging market economies: Hong Kong SAR, Israel, South Korea, Singapore, 
Taiwan.  35
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IX.   APPENDIX 2: RESULTS OF GRAVITY MODELS ESTIMATIONS
Table A2.1: Gravity models for trade and debt share in euros 
Tobit regression  Dependent variable: 
Explanatory Variables   trade_Euro Area  debt_euro 
Euro Area real growth differential   0.48***(0.12)  -1.34***(0.18)  
Euro Area per capita nom.GDP differential with  -0.54***(0.04)   2.32***(0.26)  
Relative distance from the euro area   -1.58*** (0.02)   -0.25***(0.01)  
Trade with the euro area    0.17*** (0.00)  
Debt in euro  0.31*** (0.01)    
Former French colony  0.18*** (0.00)   0.10*** (0.00)  
Euro Area interest rate differential     -0.37 (0.33)  
FX_euro/US dollar    -0.21*** (0.02)  
FX_euro/Japanese yen    -11.61*** (1.95) 
FX_euro/British pound    0.13*** (0.02)  
_const  -2.14***(0.22)   12.20*** (1.37)  
Number of obs.  34,579  20,098 
No of uncensored obs.  34,348  19,497 
left-censored 146  601 
right-censored 85  0 
Notes: * denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, *** denotes significance at 1%; robust std. errors 
between brackets 
Table A2.2: Gravity models for trade and debt share in US dollar 
Tobit regression  Dependent variable: 
Explanatory Variables   trade_US   debt_US dollar 
US Real growth differential    -0.09 (0.08)  -0.19  (0.23)  
US Per capita nom. GDP differential  0.28*** (0.02)   0.19** (0.09)  
Relative distance from the US   -0.87*** (0.01)   -0.33*** (0.01)  
Trade with the US     0.12*** (0.00) 
Debt in US dollar   0.14*** (0.00)    
US Interest rate differential    2.08*** (0.47)  
FX_US dollar/euro    -0.06**(0.03)  
FX_ US dollar /Japanese yen    1.27 (2.27) 
FX_ US dollar /British pound    0.00 (0.03) 
_const  -0.13***(0.02)   0.62*** (0.07)  
Number of obs.  34,579  20,098 
No of uncensored obs.  33,553  19,851 
left-censored 1,023  0 
right-censored 3  247 
Notes: * denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, *** denotes significance at 1%; robust std. errors 
between brackets 36
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Table A2.3: Gravity models for trade and debt share in British pound 
Tobit regression  Dependent variable: 
Explanatory Variables   trade_GB  debt_GBP 
GB Real growth differential  0.37*** (.04)  0.09 (.08)  
GB Per capita nom. GDP differential  -0.02* (.01)   -0.41*** (.02)  
Relative distance from the GB   -0.09*** (.00)   -0.06*** (.00)  
Trade with Great Britain    .13*** (.00) 
Debt in British pound  0.59*** (.01)    
Former UK colony  0.09*** (.00)  0.03*** (.00) 
GB Interest rate differential     0.27* (0.15)  
FX_ British pound /euro    0.00 (0.01)  
FX_ British pound /US dollar    0.00 (0.01) 
FX_ British pound / Japanese yen    1.46 (1.13) 
_const  0.01 (.03)   -.83*** (.04)  
Number of obs.  34,579  20,098 
No of uncensored obs.  34,055  13,022 
left-censored 522  7.076 
right-censored 2  0 
Notes: * denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, *** denotes significance at 1%; robust std. errors 
between brackets 
Table A2.4: Gravity models for trade and debt share in Japanese yen 
Tobit regression  Dependent variable: 
Explanatory Variables   trade_JP   debt_JPY 
JP Real growth differential   0.69*** (0.04)  -0.25*** (0.08)  
JP Per capita nom. GDP differential  0.14*** (0.01)   0.07** (0.03)  
Relative distance from Japan  -0.19*** (0.00)   -.03*** (0.00)  
Trade with Japan    .35*** (0.01) 
Debt in Japanese yen  0.47*** (0.00)    
JP Interest rate differential     -0.56** (0.24)  
FX_US dollar/euro    0.00 (0.00)  
FX_ US dollar /Japanese yen    0.00  (0.00) 
FX_ US dollar /British pound    .00 (.00) 
_const  -0.75***(.07)   -.40** (.19)  
Number of obs.  34,579  20,098 
No of uncensored obs.  33,692  15,744 
left-censored 878  4,354 
right-censored 9  0 
Notes: * denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, *** denotes significance at 1%; robust std. errors 
between brackets 37
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Table A2.5: Outcome of pooled tobit estimations before and after 1999_British pound 
shares 
  Model 1/pooled tobit  Model 2/ IV tobit 
(based on gravity equations) 

















































































Latin America      REF  REF      REF  REF 
























Number of obs.  20,562  12,410  20,562  12,410  20549  12362  20549  12362 
uncensored obs.  12,707  7,827  12,707  7,827  14376  8068  14376  8068 
left-censored 7,836  4,583  7.836  4,583  4553  3760  4553  3760 
right-censored 19 0  19 0  1620 534  1620  534 
Chow test   90.36 [0.00]***  125.58  [0.00]***  151.68 [0.00]***  516.59[0.00]*** 
Notes: Pooled tobit specifications 1a) and 2a) do not take into account regional aspects; regional dummies are included in 
specifications 1b) and 2b) specifications; * denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, *** denotes 
significance at 1%; robust std. errors between brackets; The outcome of a Chow test for coefficients equality is reported. 38
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1353
June 2011
Table A2.6: Outcome of pooled tobit estimations before and after 1999_Japanese Yen 
shares 
  Model 1/pooled tobit  Model 2/ IV tobit 
(based on gravity equations) 
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Number  of  obs.  20,562 12,410 20,562 12,410 20549 12362  20549  12362 
uncensored obs.  12,534  6,709  12,534  6,709  14376  8068  14376  8068 
left-censored  8,027 5,701 8,027 5,701 4553 3760  4553  3760 
right-censored  1 0 1 0 1620  534  1620  534 
Chow test   17.49 [0.00]***  92.83 [0.00]***  151.68 [0.00]***  516.59[0.00]*** 
Notes: Pooled tobit specifications 1a) and 2a) do not take into account regional aspects; regional dummies are included in 
specifications 1b) and 2b) specifications; * denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%,*** denotes 
significance at 1%; robust std. errors between brackets; The outcome of a Chow test for coefficients equality is reported. WORKING PAPER SERIES
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